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Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes are key
to reducing the effects of the economic crisis among the
poor in Latin America. Their implementation, however,
entails two risks: an increase in political clientelism (exchange of
votes for favours) and the widening of the power gap between
the poor population and local authorities. In order to gain access
to the programme and receive financial aid, families rely on the
authorities in charge of registering beneficiaries and checking
compliance with conditionalities. As a result, government
actors enjoy a better power position at the local level
and/or are able to ask for political support in return.
Brazil’s Bolsa Família designed preventive procedures to reduce
these risks: the eligibility criteria for beneficiary families are clear;
beneficiary databases are public; municipalities are involved
in identifying poor families and validating conditionalities;
benefits are paid through banking institutions; and there are
Social Accountability Boards to oversee and monitor the authorities
responsible for these activities. Local authorities and civil society
are equally represented on these boards, following the
participatory management model that Brazil has applied
to its social protection policy.
Apart from these measures, Bolsa Família strengthened direct
relationships and inhibited the mediation of leaders and
organisations in order to prevent political clientelism at the
local level. Its designers sought to prevent the programme
from being used for clientelistic purposes by eliminating any
type of social intermediation (through social organisations) and
political intermediation (through the participation of political
parties or other political actors) in the process of selection into
the programme, in the renewal of beneficiary status, in the
payment of the benefit, and in the graduation processes.
Information on how to register for Bolsa Família was disseminated
through television and radio, as well as in schools. Communication
with beneficiary families was established through letters and
welfare services offices.
The decision to prevent intermediation had positive intended
consequences. The most important outcome was the beneficiaries’
awareness of the limited clientelistic use of Bolsa Família at the local
level. A survey conducted among programme beneficiaries in two
low-income districts of São Paulo and Salvador showed that
84 per cent of respondents thought that local leaders were not
trying to take advantage of the programme for political and
electoral purposes. Only 2.4 per cent stated that they had heard
threats about the programme being phased out if a particular
candidate did not win the election. Nonetheless, this does not
imply a lack of political intent in the use and distribution of
Bolsa Família at the national level, particularly as regards the
increase in the number of beneficiaries depending on
the electoral calendar.
The avoidance of intermediation, however, had at least
two unintended consequences. First, beneficiaries found it
difficult to receive information, and to oversee and monitor
the programme from the bottom. Because the beneficiaries
lacked channels for communication and organisation, it was
not possible to solve common problems collectively or to gain
access to more information about other social programmes.
Second, individual beneficiaries and public authorities continued
to yield asymmetric power: to confront a family on its own
with the governmental machinery of bureaucracy results in a
growing power disparity that collective action tries to level out.
Incorporating interests makes their representation more
feasible and allows their voice to be heard, especially among
the poor who lack other ways to access the public sphere.
But Bolsa Família’s beneficiaries face problems in being
“represented” on the Social Accountability Boards because
of the shortage of local groups and leaders that can
perform that task.
This circumstance contributes to the depoliticisation of the
organisations that formally exist for the purposes of social control
and civic involvement: without effective representation and power
resources, Bolsa Família’s social control organisations have become
“decorative” rather than participatory decision-making bodies.
Hence, for the positive effects of CCTs to reach the poorest
population in Latin American countries, there is a need to
strengthen and promote channels for civic involvement
and social accountability, wherein the poor are no longer
considered part of the problem but rather become engaged
actors who are part of the solution.